Make the
future trustless
with us
Trustworthy silicon is essential to security.
Secure and trustworthy silicon is essential for scalable privacy and a decentralised world.
Help us make Secure, Open, Verified Silicon (SOVS) a reality.
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If you (want to) use TEEs in your system, please reach out and tell us about your use case, and threat model.
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If you design or break TEEs or secure protocols, help us map out the design space. You can act as advisor and/or grantee.
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You want to support the development of next-generation secure TEEs
Making more secure hardware a reality, in a world of convenience and shortcuts, requires the support of visionary capital. Help us help the world move forward into a trustless future.
FAQ
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Create a blueprint for what it takes to make secure and fully open source TEEs
Disburse grants to projects that contribute to #1
Nurture an active community of TEE-interested parties, in service of #1
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The Trustless TEE project is stewarded by ml_sudo and Quintus Kilbourn, and was initiated by Flashbots.
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Three grants are in moderate to advanced stages of discussion. Contact us for more details if you are interested.
We are currently fundraising so that we can disburse those grants.
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The Trustless TEE project operates under the administration of the PBS Foundation, a Swiss Foundation.
It is not a for-profit project. Funds raised are considered donations.
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We’re open to suggestions
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We see secure hardware as a powerful complement to MPC and other forms of programmable crypto. For instance, TEEs can help to protect MPC schemes against collusion attacks.
In other cases, TEEs are provide a low-overhead alternative to unprotected computation when cryptographic schemes are simply too slow or expensive.
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Open hardware is a complex topic. In the ideal case, everything required to verify and replicate designs is publicly available.
However, given the current state of the hardware ecosystem, our current plans for an open source TEE entail open sourcing security-critical RTL, while some non-critical 3rd party IP and the GDS remain closed. We are exploring means to add additional transparency into the design, such as additionally targeting ASAP7.
For research-focused projects, such as PUF security evaluations, we believe publicising GDS files are required. This both enables reproducibility and lowers friction for red-teams.